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41 Introduction
1.1 Background
A company or a businessman who has not heard of the phenomenon Óinterference with
contractual relationsÓ might end up in a situation having to pay billions in damages. Certainly,
this was the case in a dispute between two oil company giants, Pennzoil Company and Texaco
Inc., in which an agreement in principle between Pennzoil Company and Getty Oil Company
was, in a lawsuit, established to amount to a contractual relation. Texaco Inc. had negotiated with
Pennzoil,  offered a better deal than Getty Oil and eventually, after the agreement in principle
already mentioned was closed, signed a ÓfinalÓ agreement with Pennzoil. In court Texaco Inc. was
held to have interfered with the Pennzoil-Getty Oil contractual relation and was ordered to pay
$10.53 billion in damages.1 Certainly, a better understanding and knowledge about interference
with contractual understanding would have been valuable to Texaco!
The phenomenon of interference with contractual relations, however, stems from an English case,
namely, Lumley v Gye (see below), and consists of a tri-partite situation where C persuades B to
break his contract with A. The persuasion is what constitutes the interference. It has been held
that it is wrong to interfere and to be an accomplice in a breach of contract and, therefore, the
interfering party should be liable to pay damages in such cases, provided that A has suffered
pure economic loss. However, this approach or opinion regarding interference with contractual
relations differs in different legal systems. It is, therefore, important to make a comparative
study in order to get a deeper understanding about the interference tort.
1.2 Presentation of the problem
What then is the core of the problem when taking a stand for or against liability for interference
with contractual relations? The answer to that question is that one can have different opinions of
the directions in which claims for compensation should be possible when a contract has been
breached. Some legal systems argue that liability for pure economic loss can only be held on
contractual basis, while other systems argue that such liability can also be held on a non-
contractual basis. The first solution, thus, implies that only B can be held to pay damages. The
second solution, however, implies that C can also be held liable to pay damages. The basis for
this second solution is the fact that if B has no opportunity to pay damages then A could turn to
C as well. Furthermore, there could also be a wish to prevent CÕs behaviour, which is considered
disloyal and undesirable. In other words, since C is the original initiator of breaching the contract
it is only morally right that A should be able to claim compensation from C. In addition to these
arguments, liability for interference with contractual relations also depends on how much weight
is put on the contract as a legal instrument. A legal system which puts a lot of emphasis on the
contract is more willing to accept liability for interference than a legal system which does not.
1.3 Purpose
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5The purpose of this essay is, through a comparative analysis of the legal state in a number of
different legal systems, namely the Common law, French law, German law, and the laws of the
Nordic countries, to see how these systems differ in their approaches towards interference with
contractual relations. Do the different systems find the phenomenon of interference with
contractual relations a problem and, if so, in what way and which methods or techniques are used
to handle the matter? The purpose is, therefore, also to examine whether different legal systems
can, through different approaches, find different solutions to a problem such as interference with
contractual relations, and if these solutions have the same effect regarding legal protection.
Furthermore, the purpose is to study why and how come the different legal systems have chosen
to deal with the matter in different ways. Is there an underlying interest which is approached
with a different degree of protectionistic enthusiasm? If so, what are the consequences?
1.4 Delimitations
A number of delimitations are necessary. Firstly, this essay only speaks of pure economic loss.
This loss is, thus, separated from damage to person or property. Secondly, the essay is about
economic loss in non-contractual relations. However, this fact must be separated from the fact
that such loss can be compensated in contractual relations. Thirdly, I will only be dealing with
liability for intentional interference with contractual relations. Liability for negligent behaviour is,
thus, not treated. Fourthly, many interference cases can be referred to labour law. However, this
is a fact I will not focus on in this work. Finally, I have chosen to study three major legal
systems, Common law, German law and French law. In addition I have also chosen to study the
Nordic legal systems. The reason for studying these particular systems is that, since they
approach the phenomenon of interference with contractual relations in different ways and also
use different methods and techniques when doing so, a study of these systems contributes in
many ways to a deeper  understanding of interference with contractual relations.
1.5 Method and Disposition
A comparative method will be used in order to create and facilitate a deeper understanding of the
problem and the different attitudes towards it. Certainly, a comparative method can be useful,
since one can draw conclusions from different experiences in different legal systems. Moreover, a
comparative awareness can serve as a harmonizing tool when forming a future direction of law in
the area of liability for interference with contractual relations.
In my comparative excursion I will have English Common law as a starting-point, since this legal
system, through the case Lumley v Gye, initiated the doctrine of interference with contractual
relations. In my Common law study I will scan through a variety of legal cases in order to
establish the foundation, background and purpose of the tort, but I will also study English
doctrine which can be useful in order to find some underlying principles. Following this English
Common law study, I will move on to study the development of the interference tort in
American law. Here, the interference development has resulted in a second interference tort, the
so-called interference with prospective contractual relations tort. The reason for examining this
development is to see whether one can detect or discern any mutual features or principles which
emphasize and justify the existence of the first interference tort.
6I will then continue my study by examining two other legal systems, that is French and German
law, in order to establish how and to what extent these systems have approached interference
with contractual relations. This study will be based on material found in comparative doctrine
and the direction of the study is to focus and shed light on similarities and differences of
approach regarding interference questions.
Then, when examining the Nordic attitudes I will divide the examination in two parts. In the first
part I will examine the Norwegian and Danish legal systems which have a mutual approach and in
the second part I will study the Finnish and Swedish legal systems which also share a mutual
foundation. This divided study makes it possible to confront and compare different solutions. I
will also, in connection to this Nordic study, take a closer look at the Swedish legal system, since
it displays a certain unique feature. This close study will be based on Swedish prepatory work
since these are significant in Swedish law.
Based on my results from my comparative study of liability for interference with contractual
relations I will in a separate chapter focus on different contractual issues and viewpoints. This
study will also be carried out using a comparative method in order to search for a connection
between a contractual view and liability for interference with contractual relations. Following this
chapter on contractual issues there is a chapter which aims to show which interests are linked to
the interference situation. I will in this study be focusing on Swedish law in order to find out
whether different interests are linked to different approaches regarding interference with
contractual relations. Swedish law is used in this regard due to the fact that it displays a unique
and negative approach to interference with contractual relations which makes it easier to sort out
the different possible interests. I will also in this context study which effects these observations
have on the existing attitudes to the contract as a legal instrument.
The essay is concluded with a study of arguments against liability for interference with
contractual relations. This study also has the purpose of crystalising arguments in favour of such
liability. As a natural consequence, the arguments against liability have been searched for and
found in Swedish doctrine since Swedish law indicates such a negative attitude towards
interference with contractual relations.
72 Common Law
2.1 Economic Torts
Interference with contractual relations is a tort which falls into a group of torts called Economic
Torts. The Economic Torts are supposed to protect the economic relations of the plaintiff with
third parties so that the plaintiff can carry out his contract without being obstructed or injured in
his contractual dealings. Consequently, the Economic Torts stipulate what kind of economic
behaviour is desirable or rather permissible in the area between too little competition and too
much competition. Since the Common law doesn«t protect negligently caused economic loss, the
economic torts are intentional torts. This means that if a person intentionally invades a protected
interest of another without justification or excuse, he is legally and morally at fault. The
Economic Torts can be divided into two groups of torts. The first group is ÓInterference with
contractual relationsÓ, which includes torts like Óinducement of breach of contractÓ, ÓconspiracyÓ
and ÓintimidationÓ. The second group of Economic Torts, ÓInjurious falsehodd and cognate
tortsÓ, include torts like ÓInjurious falsehoodÓ and Óinfringement of rights in immaterial
propertyÓ. This essay, however, will merely concentrate on the group ÓInterference with
contractual relationsÓ which affect the plaintiffÕs economic relations in a very specific way.
Thus, the defendantÕs wrongful act is aimed at influencing the third party directly or indirectly,
through means of persuasion, inducement or intimidation, to act in a way that is injurious to the
plaintiffÕs economic relations with the third party.
2.2 Lumley vs Gye
The tort of Óinterference with contractual relationsÓ has its roots in the tort of  Óinducing breach
of contractÓ. Even though English common law from an early stage protected master-servant
relations from interference, the modern origin of Óinducing breach of contractÓ was established in
the leading case Lumley v. Gye2. In this famous case, the manager of an opera company was held
liable for inducing an opera singer, by offering her higher wages, to break her contract to sing
exclusively with the plaintiffÕs opera company instead. Several new principles were established
and this makes the case particularily interesting. Firstly, it was established that any kind of
contract, even apart from the master-servant relations, is protected from interference. Secondly,
no so-called improper means, like for instance coercion or intimidation, were needed to constitute
interference. Actually, the malice consisted of the defendantÕs intentional inducement to the
singer to break her contract. As a consequence, contractual relations are protected even from
competitive interference. Thirdly, since the defendant in the Lumley case induced the singer to
break an exclusive dealing provision, it can be noted that at least certain contractual relations are
protected from interference even if they actually restrain trade.
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82.3 Different forms of interference
Since Lumley, the tort Óinterference with contractual relationsÓ has expanded into many forms
such as direct persuasion, direct inducement, other direct intervention and finally indirect
intervention.3 These different forms display and exemplify a variety of interferences actionable.
2.3.1 Direct persuasion
To begin with, the Lumley case is a pure example of direct persuasion which is the original and
simplest form of interference, where C persuades B to break his contract with A. It makes no
difference whether it is C or B who has inititated the negotiations and it is irrelevant whether B is
eager to break the contract or not. Furthermore, the actual persuasion may involve unlawful
means such as threats but it can also amount to a quiet and peaceful dialogue. However, it is not
sufficient that a party simply enters a relation with another party who has recently breached a
contract. The fact that a party announces attractive trade terms to the public with a feeling that
another party will be motivated to breach a contract is not sufficient to constitute persuasion. It
must be shown that the defendant has actively persuaded the third party to break off his
contractual relation with the plaintiff. In addition, a distinction is made between persuading and
advising a party to breach a contract. In an attempt to illustrate this distinction it has been argued
that to persuade someone to breach a contractual relation means to create a reason for breaking it
while advice to breach a contractual relation is merely to call attention to already existing reasons.
Moreover, it has been argued that advice which has a persuasive effect cannot amount to
anything else than persuasion.4 Others, however, have argued that, since the gist of the tort is the
intention to injure, the distinction between persuasion and advice is unnecessesary.
2.3.2 Direct inducement
The second form of interference, direct inducement, is rather similar to the first form. C, who is
aware of the contractual relation between A and B, has dealings with B which he knows to be
incompatible with the A-B contractual relation, causing B to breach the same relation. However,
any persuasion is not necessary since the contract-breaker may be a willing party to the breach.
In British Motor Trade Association v. Salvatori5 the plaintiff, in order to prevent the immediate
resale of new cars, then in short supply, required purchasers to agree not to resell within twelve
months. However, the defendant interfered by purchasing cars from the primary purchaser
despite the covenant provisions which were known to him. The defendant was held to have
tortiously interfered with the car-ownerÕs contract with the Association.
2.3.3 Other direct intervention
When direct persuasion or inducement cannot be established, other circumstances can amount to
an interference when a party causes a breach of contract between others. These miscellaneous
circumstances are referred to the form called Óother direct interventionÓ. The conduct of direct
disablement is related to this form and constitutes an interference as C disables B against BÕs will
                                                
3Gerven, Tort Law, p 256
4Heydon, Economic Torts, p 26
5[1949] Ch 556, ChD. see also Gerven, Tort law, p 256
9to perform according to his contract with A. Undoubtedly, the means used are often unlawful but
this is not a necessary condition for liability. A case which attracted much attention and can
serve as an example is the case G.W.K. Ltd v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd6. In this case the plaintiff
and a car manufacturer had an agreement that the car manufacturer should exhibit tyres
manufactured by the plaintiff on his cars. However, another car manufacturer who was a
competitor of the plaintiff interfered with this agreement by substituting the competitorÕs tyres
with his own and thereby disabling the first car manufacturer to perform according to his
contract. Accordingly, the actual contract-breaker did not assist in breaching the contract. As a
matter of fact, in contrast to direct inducement,  the contract-breaker is not willing to breach the
contract. Furthermore, he might not even be aware of the fact that he is in breach of the contract.
Other direct intervention does, consequently, not require the participation of the actual contract-
breaker.
2.3.4 Indirect intervention
Finally, so called indirect intervention can be established when C, who has knowledge of a
contractual relation between A and B, influences D to act in a way which render BÕs perfomance
of his contractual obligations to A impossible. For example, a company could intentionally hire
away employees from another company, making it impossible for this latter company to
perform according to its contractual obligations with other parties, of which existence the first
company was very well aware. Indirect intervention is only unlawful if unlawful means are used.
Thereby, it differs from the other forms in a very significant and important way.
2.4 Contracts protected
The different variants of interference illustrate and exemplify what kind of different business
behaviours Common law disapproves of concerning contractual relations. In that respect,
Óinterference with contractual relationsÓ can be seen as a catalogue of improper business methods
which  Common law strives and intends to steer away from. The method used is to prohibit
certain business objectives which can be considered as improper. But which contracts are then
protected towards improper business methods and improper business objectives? Are all
contractual relations protected or are some contracts privileged?
It is clear that case-law has been very willing and eager to protect contractual relations. However,
one limitation is thouroughly established in the English Common law system, namely that only
Ópromised advantages and not mere expectanciesÓ are protected7 (the American attitude,
however, is different; se below). In addition, contracts which constitute a nullity, that is illegal
contracts, are not protected. For example, contractual relations which constitute an unreasonable
restraint of trade are null and void and therefore not protected by tort. Besides these two
exceptions, virtually all contracts are protected from interference with contractual relations by
the Common law, whether the contract is express or implied, enforceable or unenforceable, term
or terminable at will. Undoubtedly, this very strong protection of the contract clearly shows that
                                                
6(1926) 42 TLR 375
7Armands, Otillbrligt ingripande i avtalsfrhllande, p 15
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the interest protected is not merely the contract interest in performances between two parties
but rather a much wider interest in contract stability.
2.5 Prerequisites of  Óinterference with contractual relationsÓ
The prerequisites of interference with contractual relations are: an existing contractual relation
between the plaintiff and some third person, knowledge by the defendant of this existing
contractual relation, intentional acts on the part of the defendant intended to disturb the
contractual relation, actual disturbance of the contractual relation and finally damages to the
plaintiff caused by the acts of the defendant.
2.5.1 Knowledge
The knowledge prerequisite is certainly necessary since otherwise there would be an obvious risk
that each and every businessman would be liable of interference with contractual relations
without even having the possibility of preventing or escaping such liability. However, it is not
necessary to have knowledge of the exact conditions or provisions of the contract. Furthermore,
knowledge is presumed when it is objectively likely that contractual relations exist considering
the way business is carried out in the world.
2.5.2 Intent
It has been established that the interference must be malicious. However, this only means that
intent to interfere with a known contract is shown. Accordingly, spite or ill-will need not be
shown. Nevertheless, it is a matter of fact that spite and ill-will frequently appear in interference
cases. In addition, reckless indifference to interfere with a contractual relation is sufficient to
amount to intent.
2.5.3 Disturbance (or breach)
It is sufficient to prove a disturbance of the contract. An actual breach of the contract is
therefore, not a necessary consequence. Accordingly, a deliberate interference is actionable if it
frustrates the contract even if there is no breach.
2.5.4 Damage and causation
Damage to the defendant must be proved. However, damage is presumed when it is considered an
inevitable consequence of a certain disturbance or breach. Naturally, there must be a causal link
so that the defendantÕs interference must cause the plaintiffÕs loss.
2.6 Justification   
Liability for interference is to be imposed unless some privilege or legal justification can be
established. Thus, one who knows of anotherÕs contract is liable for intended interference unless
he can show that a ground of justification exists. Undoubtedly, it is very interesting and
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elucidating to explore the different interests which are regarded as priveleged since it helps to
bring  a deeper understanding about the tort and its broad application. It also sheds a light on
which interests or objectives are not regarded as a justification and which therefore are considered
as actionable interferences.
To begin with, one can establish that in order to justify an interference the actual interference
must be in protection or defence of another interest which is regarded as an interest of greater
social utility than the interest in contractual stability. Consequently, itÕs a question of balancing
different social values against the social value of contractual stability.  When doing so, it is
important to recognize that the scale pan of contractual stability can carry different weights. It
can be observed that valid term contracts, on the one hand, and contracts terminable at will, on
the other hand, earn different protection and weight. Accordingly, the interest in contractual
stability is considered to be strong when it comes to valid term contracts and the freedom to
interfere is therefore limited as the contractual stability has more social utility than the freedom
to pursue business relations. The interest in contractual stability is considered less regarding
contracts terminable at will and therefore the freedom to interfere is greater on these occasions.
Accordingly, it can be noted that the weight of contractual stability is not constant when
balancing it against other social values of the society.
When investigating the other scale pan, one can note that the purpose of the interfering party can
be so honorable as to deprive the plaintiff of his freedom from interference. Admittedly, many
factors are to be considered and it has been stated that the most relevant are the nature of the
contract broken; the position of the parties to the contract; the grounds for the breach; the means
employed to procure the breach; the relation of the person procuring the breach to the person
who breaks the contract; and the object of the person in procuring the breach.8When examining
what different interests the courts have been willing to protect one can discern a variety of
interests has been considered to outweigh the contractual stability interest. For instance, the
defendant is justified when his behaviour is a result of him trying to protect his existing contract,
property interest or financial interest. Furthermore, the defendant is privileged if his acts can be
said to protect the public interest or uphold public morality. In addition, an agent can never be
liable for inducing his principal to break a contract. This is due to the unity of principal and agent
and their confidential relationship. Neither can a person with a duty to give advice be liable for
interference. The most famous case of justification is the case of Brimelow v. Casson9 in which a
privilege to uphold public morality was established. In this case an actor persuaded a theatre
proprietor to break his engagement with the manager of a troupe who paid his chorus girls such a
low wage that they were forced to prostitution to be able to afford a living.
The defendantÕs own trade interest is not a justification cause. The reason for this is that
Common law sees no reason for giving precedence to one of two self-interests, namely the
defendantÕs self-interest over the legally protected interest of the plaintiff to pursue his
contractual relation without interference from others. Thus, it is considered a moral wrong that
one existing and established legal interest should be frustrated by a following interest of a stranger
to the first contractual interest. All according to the principle; first come, first served!
                                                
8Heuston, Salmond on the Law of Torts, p 372
9[1924] 1 Ch. 302
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To sum up, the doctrine of justification serves one specific purpose, namely to allow
interferences when these are worthy of legal protection, that is when the interference serves a
social utility which weighs more than the interest to uphold contract stability. Such social values
are not easily defined and can certainly vary from time to time wherefore the scope of
justification has widened throughout the years.
2.7 Remedies
The remedies available for interference with contractual relations are damages and injunctive
relief.
2.8 Contractual freedom vs Contractual stability
The case Lumley v Gye expanded the tort of interference with contractual relations into a
universal principle in Common law stating a liability for inducing breach of any kind of contract.
It has been stated that the reasons given for the extension were firstly, that it might be
insufficient to be referred to claiming the contract-breaker since he might be insolvent or unable to
pay the damages. Secondly, itÕs a fact that damages in tort may be greater than in contract since
lost prestige is recoverable and while the damage recoverable in contract actions must be
foreseeable at the time of contracting, the damage recoverable in interference cases must be
foreseeable at the time of  breach. In addition, the duty to mitigate is lower in interference
situations. However, in addition to these reasons it is clear  that the Lumley decision also
emphasized and strengthened the interest in contractual stability. What is also important though
is that Common law recognizes the fact that contract freedom isnÕt an absolute freedom. On the
contrary there are many interests worthy of protection and since reality is complicated and
complex there has to be a  border line where contract freedom must be limited. The question is
only how to limit it and by which means. Common law has recognized that since the contract is
the basis of commercial life it is also essential to acknowledge and uphold contractual stability.
However, whenever the need for contract freedom is urgent it is always possible to resort to
justification. Thereby, both contractual freedom and contractual stability are embraced by
Common law in the interference tort.
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3. American Law
3.1 Interference with prospective contractual relations
Having examined the Common law approach to interference with contractual relations and its
continuous struggle to embrace both contractual freedom and contractual stability, it might be
interesting to glance at the American legal system to see how the interference tort has developed.
Hence, in addition to interference with contractual relations the American law recognizes the tort
Óinterference with prospective contractual relationsÓ as the second of the two so called
interference torts. As the title suggests this tort protects benefits that would have resulted from
future contracts had not the interference occured. The principle difference between this tort and
interference with contractual relations is that a legally binding agreement is not required to
constitute a tort in this case.
Accordingly, Óone who intentionally and improperly interferes with anotherÕs prospective
contractual relation is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from the
loss of the benefits of the relationÓ.10 The interference can consist of inducing or causing a person
not to enter or continue a prospective relation but it can also consist of preventing a person from
entering or continuing such a relation. It can, thus, be observed that a partyÕs interference with a
pre-contractual relation is presumed to be lawful unless it is shown that improper means were
used. To decide whether the means are improper or not several factors are to be taken into
consideration;  such as: the nature of the actorÕs conduct; the actorÕs motive; the interests of the
other with which the actorÕs conduct interferes; the interest sought to be advanced by the actor;
the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of
the other; the proximity or remoteness of the actorÕs conduct to the interference and finally the
relations between the parties.11 How to balance these factors depends on the individual case;
however, business ethics, customs and practices are essential when determining if the interference
                                                
10Restatement (Second) of Torts, ¤ 766B
11Restatement (Second) of Torts, ¤ 767
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is improper or not.12 Many courts have looked for illegal, unethical or fraudulent conduct or
malicious motives.
The principle defence of this interference tort is the privilege of competition. However, this
privilege is not absolute. A business may neither seek to restrain or destroy competition nor
cause damage for purely malicious purpose. These behaviours are considered as improper
business objectives. Consequently, deliberate breach of contract for the sole purpose of ruining
another personÕs business has been held to be an interference with prospective contractual
relations.13 The malice motive can be established, for instance, if it can be shown that the
defendant has engaged in competition with the intent of going out of business as soon as the
plaintiffÕs business has been destroyed. Moreover, malice might be established when the
defendant injures a business with which he is not actually competing. A case which can serve as
an example is Tuttle v Buck14 in which the plaintiff was a barber and the defendant was a banker.
The banker hired another barber to compete with the plaintiff with the sole purpose to injure the
plaintiff and drive him out of business. Furthermore, the banker sought to induce customers to
support his shop instead of the plaintiffÕs and spread false and malicious accusations and
rumours about the plaintiff. It was concluded that the banker had abused his great wealth and
position in the community and the case amounted to an interference with prospective contractual
relations.
Where interference with prospective contractual relations is proved, the available remedies are
damages, restitution and injunctive relief.
3.2 Freedom of trade vs trade stability
The extension of the interference tort into interference with prospective contractual relations is
an exciting feature, certainly not uncontroversial, in American law. When English law refuses to
acknowledge such an extension, the foremost practitioner of competition, America, recognizes
this tort as an important means to secure trade stability. However, just as interference with
contractual relations comprises a tension between freedom of contract and contract stability, the
interference tort regarding prospective contractual relations seems to  be affected by a
corresponding tension between freedom of trade and trade stability. Being aware of this fact, it is
easy to draw the conclusion that freedom of trade should be the prevailing interest in a country
which promotes competition. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is too easily reached and does not
recognize the core of the tension. As in the case of freedom of contract v contract stability, the
interference tort of prospective contractual relations holds a wish to embrace both trade stability
and the possibility of freedom of trade. The reason for this is, of course, that both trade stability
and freedom of trade are necessary and basic elements in competition. For a market to function
satisfactory, businessmen need to trust their trade to be stable. An unstable trade situation is
very costly since the businessmen need to secure their dealings. Therefore, trade stability is cost-
efficient and wholesome for competition. On the other hand, if freedom of trade is restricted it
does not promote competition since such a restriction disturbs an efficient cost allocation.
Nevertheless, even if there obviously is a tension between freedom of trade and trade stability,
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American law does not consider these elements to be incompatible. Thus, the American solution
lies in the definition of trade freedom. Hence, trade freedom is considered to be a freedom of a
business to pursue prospective trade relations without undue interference. Admittedly, it is easy
to recognize that this definition does not contradict a promotion of trade stability. Certainly, this
solution, embracing both trade freedom and contract stability, strengthens the basis of
competition, at least in theory. In practice or real life, however, the interference with prospective
contractual relations tort is controversial and since it carries a lot of difficulties in interpreting
what is undue interference, or rather improper interference, the tension between trade stability
and freedom of trade is indeed very obvious and difficult to handle.
3.3 The American contract view
The American attitude and readiness to protect interests which have not yet been manifested nor
resulted in a contract demonstrates a very specific view on the contract as such. There is no
doubt that this attitude emphasizes and upholds the importance of the contract as a legal
instrument. Again, the opinion that the contract is the basis of all commercial life influences the
scope of protection one is willing to implement. Therefore, to strengthen and emphasize the
importance of the contract as such, American law is willing to protect prospective contractual
relations from improper interferences. This position also indicates a fear, that if prospective
contractual relations were not protected from improper interferences, this would have a
weakening effect on the contract as a legal instrument since it would be more vulnerable to
economic or some other abuse. As a consequence, the American conclusion would thus be that a
weak contract results in a weak commercial life.
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4. Pure Economic Loss
4.1 A comparative study
After having studied the two so-called interference torts, I will now continue to examine whether
these torts exist in other legal systems or if they have any equivalent or display any similarities
with other possible solutions. In other words, have the other European legal systems recognized
interference with contractual relations as a problem which has got to be dealt with and be referred
to a legal regulation? I intend to approach the matter by examining the views on pure economic
loss since liability for interference with contractual relations depends on a positive attitude
towards compensation for pure economic loss regarding intentionally caused interference torts.
Thus, I will start by comparing the Common Law system with the French legal system. Later,
with conclusions drawn from this comparison,  I  will go on to examine the German legal system
to put their view in relation to the Common Law and French systems. Finally, I will continue to
the Nordic countries to see how they have approached the issue. I will then examine the Swedish
law in particular since Sweden has a unique perspective or approach concerning compensation
for pure economic loss and interference with contractual relations.
4.2 Common law approach compared with French law
As I have implied, liability for interference with contractual realations depends on the view of
pure economic loss. English Common law has a very restrictive view on compensating pure
economic loss. However, it recognizes that it is urgent to protect certain valuable interests and is
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therefore willing to compensate certain intentionally caused loss. Thus, the English method of
imposing liability for pure economic loss is the so-called Ópigeon-holeÓ approach15 which limits
liability through specifying and defining certain interests worthy of protection from a specified
form of attack. Interference with contractual relations is such a tort which is considered legally
and morally wrong and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to compensation for their pure
economic loss. In short, English Common law does not recognize any general rights which
deserve protection but rather enumerates certain specific interests protected through a catalogue
of torts.
Having examined the English Common law approach to pure economic loss, it is very interesting
to study French law since its view on pure economic loss is quite the opposite from the English.
As a result, French law does not specify or try to sort out certain legal interests which are more
valuable and thus more worthy of protection than others. Instead, French law establishes that all
rights and interests deserve protection, with the exception of illicit interests. All behaviour which
is considered wrongful or dangerous is socially unacceptable and French law intends to
discourage such socially undesirable behaviour by imposing liability. Accordingly, every injury
which is caused by such behaviour can be recovered. Thus, French law, as a contrast to English
law, offers full protection to all kinds of legitimate interests. The basis for this protection is the
general clause of Article 1382 of the Code Civil, which states that ÓAnyone who, through his act,
causes damage to another by his fault shall be obliged to compensate the damageÓ.16 It is
therefore clear that the interest protected in English law by the tort interference with contractual
relations is also protected in French law. The principle is, however, known as Óliability of a
third-party accomplice to a contractual breachÓ.17 There is an uncertainty, though, if it is
sufficient that the interfering party knew of the contract or if collusion with the contracting party
is required. However, it is presumed that the first view is prevailing.18
What is even more interesting when examining French law, is the fact that, through its generous
view on recovery for pure economic loss, it protects the same interests which in American law
are protected by the tort called Óinterference with prospective contractual relationsÓ. In France
this figure is named Óloss of chanceÓ (perte dÕune chance)19 and it recognizes recovery when the
opportunity has been real and not merely hypothetical. Once again, Article 1382 is the basis for
this liability.
When comparing English Common law and French law it becomes obvious that although different
methods or techniques are used both systems protect the same interests and they achieve the
same effects regarding Óinterference with contractual relationsÓ. While English law, on the one
hand, only recognizes some particularily protectionworthy interests which are specified in detail,
French law, on the other hand, with its general clause embraces the idea that all legal interests are
worthy of protection. Therefore, French law directly focuses on questions of fault, causation and
damage instead of distinguishing or sorting out certain valuable interests. It is evident, though,
that both English law with its restrictive view on pure economic loss and French law with its
generous view on pure economic loss protect from Óinterference with contractual relationsÓ. This
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matter of fact emphasizes and underlines the opinion that the existence of a contractual relation is
a legal circumstance which third parties cannot completely disregard when they do business with
or deal with one of the contracting parties. Thus, both systems dislike and disapprove of
interference. Moreover, this also means that both systems acknowledge the fact that contractual
stability is important and indeed this attitude intends to uphold and strengthen the contract as a
legal instrument. Furthermore, both systems represent the opinion that contractual freedom is
not an absolute freedom, but rather a freedom to contract without undue interference from a third
party who is a stranger to the contractual relation.
A similar argumentation can be held when comparing the American tort Óinterference with
prospective contracual relationsÓ and the French equivalent Óloss of chanceÓ. Again, different
techniques are used in the different systems but the effect is the same. Accordingly, the existence
of a prospective contractual relation is a fact that a third party cannot close his eyes to. On the
contrary, this is something that the third party has to respect in his dealings with one of the
prospective parties. American and French law thus show the same protective attitude towards
trade stability and both systems recognize that trade freedom is not an absolute freedom, but
rather a freedom to trade without undue interference from a third party.
4.3 German law and Pure Economic Loss
As we have seen, Common law and the French approaches to pure economic loss differ
substantially. Thus, English Common law maintains a pigeon-hole technique to protect certain
values worth protecting while French law sustains a broad general clause to thwart socially
unacceptable behaviour. It has been shown that a contractual relation is such an interest worth
protecting from interference, which is considered to be a socially unacceptable behaviour if intent
and knowledge can be shown.
In comparison German law with its Brgerliches Gesetzbuch has yet another third line of
approach regarding pure economic loss. BGB has neither chosen the French solution with a
general clause nor the pigeon-hole procedure so characteristic of Common law. Instead, the BGB
has laid down three limited yet broad general torts which apply to many different situations yet
acknowledge the restrictive view of German law concerning pure economic loss. Two of these
torts can be found in ¤ 823 BGB. Firstly, ¤ 823 (1) BGB, which can be considered to be the main
tort, concludes that ÓAnyone who intentionally or negligently injures life, body, health, freedom,
ownership or any other right of another in a manner contrary to law shall be obliged to
compensate the other for the loss arisingÓ.20 What is interesting with this article is the fact that it
declares certain specific privileged and absolute rights which are always to be secured whether
they are interfered with negligently or intentionally. However, apart from this main tort German
law has also recognized that there are other rights which deserve protection. Thus, ¤ 823 (2)
BGB imposes liability if a law which is intended to protect another person is infringed.21
However, German law has considered that these two broad torts found in ¤ 823 BGB are limiting
liability for pure economic loss to an extent which in many different cases can appear offensive,
objectionable or doubtful. Therefore, in addition to these torts, liability also arises under ¤ 826
BGB which states that ÓAnyone who intentionally causes harm to another in a manner contra
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bonos mores is liable to the other for the harm thereby occasionedÓ.22 Certainly, this tort
mitigates the limitations established in ¤ 823 BGB and which only protect a number of privileged
and absolute rights. German law has, thus, produced a particular tort which does not refer  to any
specifically defined legal interest or enactment as is the case with ¤ 823 BGB, but rather protects
society from offences against morals. This particular tort, however, requires intent. Admittedly,
this fact underlines a basic feature in German law, namely, that although there is a restrictive
view on compensation for pure economic loss, there is an emphasis on the fact that different legal
interests deserve differentiated protection.23
4.3.1 ¤ 826 BGB, Contra bonos mores
There is no doubt that ¤ 826 BGB is a very exciting provision and, moreover, a very interesting
solution when providing protection for pure economic loss. It is, furthermore, a significant
provision in this study since it is under this article that liability may arise in German law for
interference with contractual relations. Accordingly, I will in this section examine this tort and its
connection to interference with contractual relations.
To begin with, liability under ¤ 826 BGB can, thus, be imposed when someone intentionally
causes harm to another in a manner contra bonos mores. In contrast to ¤ 823 BGB, a first
condition for the application of  ¤ 826 BGB is that intent must be shown. It has been held that
intention in this case includes both intent and recklessness.24 However, intention is not
sufficient. German law, thus, requires under ¤ 826 BGB that the conduct is intentional and, in
addition, contra bonos mores. Admittedly, the notion contra bonos mores is indeed interesting
since it indicates that there is such a thing as a prevailing morality which deserves to be upheld
and protected. Consequently, it has been argued that there are some Óminimum standards of
conduct required by legal and social ethicsÓ.25 Good morals have in this context been defined as
Óthe sense of propriety of all good and right-thinking members of societyÓ.26 Furthermore,
behaviour contra bonos mores is considered to offend Ófundamental concepts of morally
acceptable conduct towards persons with whom one is in a legal relationshipÓ.27 In conclusion,
one can maintain that ¤ 826 BGB can be seen as a legal-ethical provision which is supposed to
protect from behaviour regarded as unacceptable in society.
The article ¤ 826 BGB has been used by the courts in a variety of cases where the behaviour has
been considered so improper as to be likely to meet with strong disapproval from the average
person in the relevant section of society.28 It is therefore very interesting to observe that liability
for interference with contractual relations has been referred to this provision in the BGB.
Accordingly, liability has been held, for instance, for inducing breach of contract.It has, however,
been established that interference with contractual relations as such does not amount to a
behaviour contra bonos mores. Through case-law it has been argued that there is no moral order
which obliges a third party to respect someone elseÕs contract to the extent that it subordinates
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its own interests. Therefore, to amount to an act that can be considered to be contra bonos
mores, the interference must consist of a lack of consideration or be incompatible with decency
or Ówith the basic requirements of a proper view of the lawÓ.29 Collusion with a party to the
contract in question is an example of such manners. However, all circumstances in an individual
case must be considered.30
4.3.2 German law compared with other systems
Through examining the three broad torts in ¤ 823 and ¤ 826 BGB one can easily detect a firm
reluctance to admit recovery for pure economic loss. This reluctance is very reminiscent of the
restrictive view of English Common law. However, whereas English Common law specifies
certain detailed torts  German law generally protects certain privileged and absolute rights. This
approach is signicative of  German law and derives from the attitude that different legal interests
deserve differentiated protection. Consequently, a contractual relation is not as worthy of
protection as the interests of life, body and health. In contrast to these systems, French law has a
very generous view on pure economic loss allowing recovery for all rights which are shown to be
interfered with.
It can be held that in German law a contractual relationship is not among those privileged and
absolute rights which are always to be protected from interferences. However, it has been
recognized that beside these absolute rights protected in ¤ 823 BGB there are certain values
which cannot be trampled on or interfered with at any cost. German law thereby acknowledges
the idea that one has to consider the quality of the conduct. Accordingly, an interference with a
contractual relation can be conducted in many different ways and not every interference qualifies
for protection. Consequently, interferences considered morally or ethically unacceptable, such as
for instance collusion, can render liability under ¤ 826  BGB.  This emphasis or interest in the
quality of the conduct cannot be detected in either French law or English Common law.
The main rule governing recovery for pure economic loss, ¤ 823 BGB, can be seen as an
exclusionary rule. However, it is not an absolute exclusionary rule. The Germans have recognized
the importance of having a flexible system which can take moral and ethical aspects into
consideration. Undoubtedly, these social values are not constant but change with time. The
system therefore allows for future developments when such developments appear to be crucial
for society from a moral, legal or ethical point of view. This attitude also enables the law to
consider each and every individual case as important. Certainly, this individualistic approach,
which is possible due to ¤ 826 BGB, is a result of an acknowledgement that an exclusionary
system undoubtedly leaves individual cases in the dark being more interested in excluding
recovery for a large number of groups. The German law, however, has through ¤ 826 BGB put an
emphasis on the inappropriateness of precluding recovery in certain offensive and objectionable
cases. As such, article 826 BGB can clearly be seen as a legal-ethical provision which condemns
socially unacceptable behaviour. This disapproval of and this willingness to deal with socially
unacceptable behaviour is a feature which can easily be recognized also in French law. The
difference is that French law accepts recovery for negligently and intentionally caused harm while
¤ 826 BGB only allows recovery for intentionally caused harm.
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It is, again, very interesting to observe how yet another system with a different technique and
approach to pure economic loss recognizes the need to protect contractual relations from
interferences. The German protection, however, is not an automatic or self-evident matter.
Consequently,  German law is willing to take measures to protect a contractual relation only
when the interference is considered to be morally or ethically reprehensible. Still, through ¤ 826
BGB, German law has recognized that the contract as a legal instrument can be unacceptably
weakened through certain interferences and, furthermore, it has recognized that an absolute
exclusionary rule will contribute to such a weakening process and this is not acceptable in a
commercial society.
When comparing German law with Common law and French law one can observe that German
law, in contrast to the the other systems, puts contract freedom in the foreground while the
notion of contract stability is somewhat more emphasized in Common law and French law.
Accordingly, when contract freedom in Common law and French law can be defined as a freedom
to contract without undue interference from a third party, the German definition of contract
freedom is rather a freedom to contract without interferences which are held to be morally and/or
ethically reprehensible. Admittedly, certain interferences will fall into both categories and one
could argue that the difference is subtle but, nevertheless, when comparing case-law one can
easily discern the difference of approach. Mere knowledge, for instance, of the contractual
relation will not suffice in German law to make the interference reprehensible, while this fact will
amount to an undue interference in the other two systems. However, it is important not  to
overemphasize  this lack of  consideration  for contract  stability.  The  mere  existence of  
¤ 826 BGB is an acknowledgement that contract stability is necessary to uphold.
4.4 Pure Economic Loss in the Nordic countries
After having examined the different views of pure economic loss in  three legal systems and also
these systemÕs protection from interference with contractual relations, I will now go on to
examine the approach of pure economic loss in the Nordic countries. However, it can initially be
established that the Nordic countries do not share a similar viewpoint but can rather be referred
to either of two separate lines of development. From this starting-point I will approach the
Nordic countries in two different sections. Firstly, I will study Danish and Norwegian law and,
secondly, I will focus on Swedish and Finnish law. Moreover, I will in a following third section
take a closer look at the Swedish approach to pure economic loss since it displays a certain
unique feature.
4.4.1 Danish and Norwegian law - The doctrine of unlawfulness
As already stated there is no uniform Nordic view of pure economic loss, despite the fact that
Nordic co-operation frequently has resulted in uniform laws, for instance the law of contracts.
Instead, the Nordic approach can be divided into two separate branches. Thus, Norwegian and
Danish law early based its view on the doctrine of unlawfulness.31 The basic idea behind this
doctrine is to determine liability through a Óweighing of the benefit produced by an act against the
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injury or risk of injury that the act gives rise toÓ.32 There is, consequently, no general tort
principle in Norwegian and Danish law concerning pure economic loss. Instead, the courts have
been free to attack pure economic damage caused by intentional acts whenever this has been held
to be necessary. Thereby, the courts have been able through the above mentioned weighing
technique to distinguish lawful conduct from unlawful conduct. Norwegian and Danish law have,
thus, recognized the complex nature of reality by not adopting a simple rule to apply
consistantly to different cases full of nuances.
Norwegian law has, however a firmer and more positive attitude when it comes to compensating
pure economic loss in tort. Whereas in Denmark there is a presumption that tort law merely
protects absolute rights and legal interests while the pure economic interests are preserved in
contract law33, the unlawfulness doctrine is in Norwegian law supported by the Marketing Act.
This Act includes a broad general clause, ¤ 1, which establishes that liability for interference with
contractual relations can be held if the interference is performed in a way contrary to good
customs.34 It has been argued in Norwegian doctrine that this provision with its reference to good
customs is based on economic policies and that these policies must be taken into consideration
when deciding and drawing the borderline between contract freedom and contract stability.
Although Norwegian law is more eager to defend contractual relations from interferences than
Danish law there is no doubt that Danish courts have upheld contractual relations through the
support of the unlawfulness doctrine whenever this has been held necessary to protect
commercial life from unacceptable behaviour. An example of a typical case would be
misinformation forwarded to a non-contracting party.35 Thus, both Norwegian and Danish law,
based on the doctrine of unlawfulness, are willing to compensate pure economic loss in
interference cases. A condition required, though, is the fact that the interference must offend good
morals or consist of some other unacceptable behaviour. The unlawfulness doctrine can,
consequently, be used to weigh the benefit of contract stability against the injury of contract
freedom in interferences with contractual relations.
4.4.2 Finnish and Swedish law - The exclusionary rule
It can immediately be established that Finnish and Swedish law were not particularily influenced
by the doctrine of unlawfulness which has played such an important and significant role in the
Norwegian and Danish development of a tort system. Even though the Norwegian and Danish
approach to pure economic loss can be regarded as cautious, Swedish and Finnish law display an
even more restrictive attitude by indicating that pure economic loss only will be recoverable if
caused by a criminal act. This principle, which can be regarded as an absolute exclusionary rule, is
somewhat modified in Finnish law by the important addition that pure economic loss also may
be recoverable in tort if there is a serious reason for it. Since Finnish law to a larger extent
resembles solutions found in other legal systems, I will at first concentrate on the Finnish
approach to pure economic loss.
Finnish law
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The Finnish Tort Law Act, enacted in 1974, certainly displayed a change of the Finnish attitude
towards pure economic loss. From having concentrated on the question of which interests were
to be protected, the Tort Law Act turned its focus to the quality of the offensive act. The
liability rule can be found in ¤ 5 SKL:
ÓDamages include compensation for harm to person and property. Compensation for other
economic harm may be included if it is caused by a punishable act or by a public authority
or otherwise if there is a serious reason for itÓ.36
The article can, certainly, be seen as an exclusionary rule which demonstrates the restrictive
Finnish approach. There is no doubt that the Finnish legal order does not seek to attain
limitations on the freedom of action but rather strives for such freedom.
The Finnish Tort Law Act is based on the Swedish Tort Law Act, enacted in 1972. However, the
Finnish system considered the Swedish view on pure economic loss to be far too restrictive with
its single reference to criminal acts. Earlier case-law had also allowed compensation for pure
economic loss not caused by criminal acts. Hence the important addition of  Óa serious reasonÓ.
What then is implied by a serious reason? It can be held that such reason exists when the damage
is caused intentionally or when thereÕs a question of some other evidently disloyal behaviour. To
spread disparaging and untrue information about a company is an example of such behaviour.
Furthermore, inducement of breach of contract and intimidation are considered to be disloyal
behaviour amounting to a serious reason.37 However, mere persuasion is not sufficient but if the
purpose is to injure liability can be imposed whether the persuasion results in a breach or merely
prevents or delays performance.38
It has been argued in Finnish doctrine that society has no reason to allow intentional interference
with contractual relations since it is in the best interest of society that contracts are performed as
agreed.39 Again, this kind of argument indicates an acknowledgement of the importance of
contractual stability. Moreover, Finnish law displays a wish to uphold the contract as a legal
instrument when it is attacked by serious and unacceptable interferences. Admittedly, this is a
feature which can be recognized from the other above examined legal systems.
In a comparative light Finnish law share the same restrictive approach towards pure economic
loss as English Common law and German law. The technique used, though, shows no
resemblance to the Common law technique. Instead, it can be argued that the Finnish law in
several ways is particularily closely linked to the German law. Firstly, the division of the three
bases of liability in German law can also be found in ¤ 5:1 SKL, namely, infringement of legal
interest, breach of statute and, finally, offence against morals which can convincingly be
compared to a serious reason.40 Finnish doctrine has, also, recognized that whenever a behaviour
offends ethical principles or good morals this fact should constitute a serious reason which
should be compensated.41 Undoubtedly, the notion of a serious reason resembles the notion of
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contra bonos mores in ¤ 826 BGB. Secondly, the focus or emphasis on the quality of the conduct
is a feature well recognized from German tort law. In both systems the nature of the behaviour
holds a central position. Thirdly, both Finnish and German law can be held to have construed an
exclusionary rule, however not absolutely so. This fact emphasizes the wish to balance
contractual stability with an important freedom of contract.
Swedish law
As I have already mentioned above the Swedish Tort Law Act of 1972 was the forerunner of the
Finnish Tort Law Act. However, the Swedish attitude towards pure economic loss is unique in
its severity and restrictiveness. Thus, ¤ 2:1 SKL inititially states that ÓWhoever causes personal
injury or property damage intentionally or negligently must make reparation....Ó.42 Then, in ¤ 2:4
SKL follows the important and special provision which states that ÓWhoever causes pure
economic loss through a crime shall compensate that injury...Ó.43 Undoubtedly, this provision
can be interpreted as an absolute exclusionary rule which prevents the courts from imposing tort
liability in cases which are not connected to a criminal offence. The unusual and narrow Swedish
solution regarding compensation for pure economic loss has its historical background. Thus,
provisions were transferred from the criminal code to be adopted in the tort legislation44 and have
since then maintained a very close connection to the criminal code.
The main rule in Swedish tort law is, accordingly, that pure economic loss only is recoverable if
caused by a criminal offence. Consequently, an express statutory provision is required if pure
economic loss is to be compensated in other cases.45 Such provisions can,  for example, be found
in Swedish competition law. Furthermore, case-law has in certain areas accepted liability for pure
economic loss caused by negligence outside pure contractual relations. The technique used for
this purpose, though, has been particular since case-law has so to speak drawn the third-party
interest within the protective sphere of a contract. Thus, a third party with a close and
protection-worthy interest in an accurate performance of a contractual relation has been provided
protection through case-law.46 Liability has, consequently, been accepted for erroneous
certificates of authenticity, affidavits and information on solvency.47 It has been argued in
Swedish doctrine that in order to accept such liability a close connection to a contractual relation
must exist and, furthermore, it must be obvious to the defendant that there is an individual or a
narrow group of individuals whose interest deserves protection.48
An example of this case-law is NJA 1987 s 11749 in which incorrect information regarding town
planning in a valuation certificate, drawn up by a professional, gave rise to compensation for a
plaintiff who had granted a mortgage loan relying on that incorrect statement. This despite the
fact that it was the recipient of the loan who had actually requested the statement. Undoubtedly,
one can discern that this developed case-law is as such not a recognition of compensation for
                                                
42Gerven, Tort Law, p 44
43Gerven, Tort Law, p 44
44Hellner, Skadestndsrtt, p 50
45¤ 1:1 SKL
46Ramberg, Allmn avtalsrtt, p 275
47Gerven, Tort Law, p 292
48Ramberg, Allmn avtalsrtt, p 276
49see also NJA 1987 s 692
25
pure economic loss in tort law, but should rather be seen as an expansion of the contractual
relation sphere.
In a comparative view Swedish law is the most reluctant legal system examined to incur liability
for pure economic loss. The exclusionary rule found in ¤ 2:4 SKL can be considered as absolute
and is therefore as such not comparable with either the German or the Finnish approach. The
prerequisite of a criminal offense cannot be found in any other legal system, except for the
Finnish, and as a consequence of this criminal offense prerequisite Swedish law does not
recognize or accept any liability for interference with contractual relations unless, of course, the
interference constitutes a criminal offence or is otherwise expressly illegal according to a
statutory provision. Swedish tort law, thus, puts a particular emphasis on the concept of
freedom of contract. As a consequence, interference with contractual relations is considered legal
and just even if it consists of undue, immoral, unethical or socially unacceptable behaviour.
Strangely enough, the Swedish system does not seem interested in balancing contractual stability
with the freedom of contract but has rather, in accordance with ¤ 2:4 SKL, taken sides with
freedom of contract against contract stability. This Swedish view of freedom of contract can,
therefore, not be defined as a freedom to contract without undue interference but rather as a
freedom to contract even with undue means of interference.
¤ 2:4 Skadestndslagen - The Swedish Exclusionary rule
Since the Swedish approach to pure economic loss differs from other approaches found in the
other examined legal systems I will in this section take a closer look at the provision ¤ 2:4 SKL
and its influence on Swedish tort law. How come it was designed so narrowly? And what were
the consequences?
Indeed it can be established that the Swedish legislature has chosen a legal principle which
implies that it is possible to regulate liability for pure economic loss in completely different areas
through one single and generally applicable rule. This rule, ¤ 2:4 SKL, is as already mentioned
considered to be an exclusionary rule with its express reference to a criminal offense.
Undoubtedly, this connection between a criminal act and damages is from an international
viewpoint a Swedish particularity.50 The actual wording of ¤ 2:4 SKL does not allow for any
exceptions whatsoever. Only victims of crime may claim compensation for pure economic loss.
Surprisingly and strangely enough, however, it is a fact that the Swedish legislature did not intend
¤ 2:4 SKL to be an absolute exclusionary rule. This is clearly established in the preparatory work
which expressly states that the wording of ¤ 2:4 SKL is not intended to prevent the courts from
imposing liability whenever this is found to be appropriate even in the absence of a punishable
act. Accordingly, the article is not intended to be exhaustive. The fact that ¤ 2:4 SKL states that
whoever causes a pure economic loss through a crime shall compensate that injury does not,
consequently, mean that whoever causes a pure economic loss through some other behaviour
than a criminal offence escapes liability to compensate that injury.51 ¤ 2:4 SKL was not
supposed to be regarded an an exclusionary rule at all. On the contrary, it was supposed to keep
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the door open for a future legal development concerning liability for pure economic loss.52 Earlier
case-law had, actually, allowed for compensation for pure economic loss without any existence
of a criminal offence and it is expressly indicated in the preparatory work that the new Tort Law
Act did not intend to alter this attitude in such cases.53 The preparatory work, accordingly,
encouraged the courts to continue developing the field of pure economic loss. ¤ 2:4 SKL, thus,
was supposed to act as a principle main standpoint provided with several exceptions. It was
never intended to prevent future case-law from extending liability in this legal field. Several
authors have in Swedish doctrine argued that Óthe possibility of having tort liability for pure
economic loss include situations not covered in chap 2, sec. 4, of the Tort Liability Act should be
viewed as a reality and the courts should be able to make use of thisÓ.54 Such situations include
interference with contractual relations. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Swedish
exclusionary rule should have a function similar to the Finnish rule55 and, consequently, it would
not be absolute in its character after all.
Undoubtedly, however, the preparatory work has not had any pervasive effect on case-law. It
has been argued that Swedish jurists certainly consider ¤ 2:4 SKL as an exclusionary rule.56
Moreover, it is a troublesome fact that the actual wording of ¤ 2:4 SKL does not contradict this
matter. As a consequence, the narrow and strict design of the rule has, certainly, influenced the
extremely positivistic view of law, which is such a particular feature of Swedish law in general
and of the law of torts in particular. There is little doubt that if the actual wording of a legal
provision does not expressly state a liability, then the Swedish courts are not willing to impose
such liability in case-law. The wording of ¤ 2:4 SKL has, consequently, in contrast to what was
intended, prevented the prepatory work from functioning as a guideline when developing
Swedish case-law. The case-law development of pure economic loss in demand has therefore
failed to appear. That the Swedish courts would refer to the prepatory work of ¤ 2:4 SKL in the
future is, accordingly, not very likely. A plaintiff is, therefore not helped by ¤ 2:4 SKL in an
interference situation which does not consitute a criminal offense.
Liability according to ¤ 2:4 SKL v an extension of the contract sphere
It has been concluded above that case-law has not accepted or been prepared to use ¤ 2:4 SKL to
impose liability for pure economic loss in cases not amounting to a crime. The actual wording has
prevented it. Thereby, the Swedish positivistic view of law has denied the fact that ¤ 2:4 SKL
could be used as an acessible provision when extending liability for such loss. However, such an
extension has been held necessary and has also actually taken place. Not through ¤ 2:4 SKL,
though, but rather by using the contractual sphere. Case-law has, therefore, as indicated earlier
been willing to impose liability, despite the absence of a criminal offence, in tri-partite relations
by expanding the contract sphere and thereby drawing the third party interest within the
contractual ambit. This expansion technique, thus, transforms a non-liability in tort into a
liability in contract. In this case the actual wording Óin contractÓ has not prevented courts from
interpreting non-contractual relations to be contractual when the third party has a close and
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protection-worthy interest. Undoubtedly, this is an inconsistent feature in the Swedish
positivistic view of law57 which, certainly, can be considered odd and surprising.
The relevant question, though, is whether this inconsistent solution makes any material
difference regarding interference with contractual relations. Or expressed in other words, is it
irrelevant whether an extension of liability for pure economic loss is made possible through ¤ 2:4
SKL or through an expansion of the contractual sphere?
Firstly, it can be argued that most interference cases cannot be drawn into the contract sphere
according to the developed case-law since the interfering party almost always is a stranger to the
contract and, therefore, has no close connection to it. Certainly, this fact excludes liability for
interference with contractual relations almost completely according to the contract expansion
solution. Secondly, it can be observed that the case-law based on an expansion of a contract
sphere has,  so far, not included pure interferences. By this I mean that the cases decided have, so
far, not included intentional interference but have rather dealt with questions of negligent
misstatements and incorrect information.
Thus, in conclusion, this case-law development with its particular and inconsistent technique,
although admittedly necessary, does not in reality make it possible to impose liability for
interference with contractual relations. An extension of case-law based on the preparatory work
of ¤ 2:4 SKL, though, would have made it possible to impose such liability for pure economic
loss. Swedish law has, accordingly, through this choice of developing case-law further
emphasized its reluctance to impose liability for interference with contractual relations.
Moreover, it has accentuated its support for freedom of contract.
Swedish property law
It has been concluded that there is no liability for interference with contractual relations in
Swedish tort law. However, in Swedish property law interference problems have been
thoroughly discussed and considered. For example, there is a right prescribed by law for a third
party, C, to make an acquisition of property in good faith even though the transferor, B, has
already, prior to the acquisition, agreed to sell the property to another party, A. Accordingly, C
must have acted in good faith. Consequently, he must have been unaware of the agreement
between A and B. In addition, he must have come in possession of the property.58
The protection of CÕs right to the property is based on the need for protection against concealed
competition. The good faith is, therefore, a necessary prerequisite and it draws a line between a
party worthy of protection and a party not worthy of such protection. It has been held that a
third party who has aquired property with knowledge of a prior and conflicting right to the
property cannot reasonably be protected from concealed competition, since the competition is
no longer concealed if the third party has knowledge of it. The prerequisite of good faith,
therefore, serves as a duty of care to prevent conflicts. Questions of morality are, therefore, held
not to be relevant in this context.59
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The Swedish method of solving conflicts in property law, thus, to a large extent resembles the
English tort law approach towards interference with contractual relations. Knowledge of a
contractual relation is equivalent to bad faith and deserves no protection. One can, certainly,
argue that a good faith/bad faith discussion would serve a purpose in Swedish tort law as well.
However, as we have seen, this is not the case.
4.5 Pure Economic Loss - A comparative summary
I have through a survey of different legal systems examined diverse approaches regarding the
possibility of compensating pure economic loss in general and through interference with
contractual relations in particular. It has been shown that although different methods or
techniques are used in different legal systems, there is a clear tendency to impose liability for
interference with contractual relations except in the Swedish legal system which in a comparative
view seems to stand on its own. Accordingly, whether the pigeon-hole technique, a general
clause, the doctrine of unlawfulness or an exclusionary rule (however not absolute in its
character) is used when regulating liability, these different means all result in a protection from
interference with contractual relations. The different legal systems, thus, although different
techniques protect the same interest, namely, the contracual relation interest. Even though
Common law and French law tend to emphasize the importance of contractual stability more
than, for instance,  German and Finnish law, there is a joint and mutual consensus that third
parties cannot completely ignore the existence of a contractual relation. Accordingly, there is a
unanimous ambition to spare and protect society from socially unacceptable behaviour and
offences against morals since these are considered to weaken the contract as a legal instrument.
These legal systems, consequently, acknowledge the fact that there are some prevailing minimum
standards of conduct required by legal and social ethics in commercial life which must be
observed in order to uphold the importance of  the contract. Interference with contractual
relations is therefore in these system considered with disapproval. Whereas some systems, for
instance Common law and French law, consider interference in itself  unacceptable, other
systems, like German law and Finnish law, pay more attention to the actual quality of the
conduct and therefore approve of some interference behaviour yet, at the same time, disapprove
of other serious and grave interference behaviour. Furthermore, the German and the Finnish legal
system share together with the Norwegian and the Danish legal system an individualistic interest
which cannot be found in Common law or  French law. Thus, this individualistic interest rests on
a belief that there is an inappropriateness of precluding recovery in certain offensive and
objectionable cases and, as a consequence, different legal interests deserve different degrees of
protection. There is, furthermore, a belief that since the commercial life is a complex reality it is
not sufficient to find a simple or general solution.
In conclusion, all the examined legal systems, except for the Swedish, acknowledge a necessity
and an ambition to balance the contract freedom against a contractual stability in order to
strengthen commercial life. Contract freedom can in these legal systems be defined as a freedom
to contract without undue interference. The Swedish legal system, in contrast, can be observed to
pay no or slight attention to this balancing of contract freedom against contractual stability.
Furthermore, Swedish law seems to show no concern for or interest in quality nuances, individual
cases or socially unacceptable behaviour unless they constitute a crime. The Swedish tort system
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can, therefore, be held to be extremely rigid and strict in its approach. Moreover, it can be held
that the Swedish exclusionary rule, being absolute in its character, does not favour or uphold
contractual stability and, as a consequence, this rule can contribute to a weakening process of the
contract as a legal instrument. To some extent this fact has been acknowledged in case-law which
has sought a solution when certain cases have seemed to result in unacceptable or reprehensible
decisions. However, the solution has not been sought in tort law but the idea has been to draw
the third party, not a party to the contract, in to the contract sphere. As argued, this has not
contributed to help come to terms with pure interference cases. In Sweden, contract freedom is,
accordingly, a freedom to contract even through means of undue interference.
5 Contract views
In the previous chapter I have argued that liability for interference with contractual relations
depends on the attitude as regards pure economic loss. Moreover, I have to some extent indicated
that the view of pure economic loss depends on the attitude towards the contract as a legal
instrument. In this chapter I will therefore, in a comparative light, focus on some of the different
aspects concerning the views of the contract and its connection to interference with contractual
relations. To begin with, I will take a closer look at contractual freedom and contractual stability.
Then, I will go on to study the difference between a so-called inner contract sphere perspective
and an outer contract sphere perspective. In this connection, I will also look at the consequences
of these two different contract perspectives.
5.1 Contractual freedom and Contractual stability
It has been argued that Ócontractual freedom is a main principle of the market economy systemÓ
and, furthermore, that it is Óthe freedom to decide whether and with whom to conclude a contract
and to give that contract such content as the parties to it may agree uponÓ.60 Nevertheless, this
contractual freedom is not, and has for that matter never been, an absolute freedom. The
contractual freedom, thus, cannot be conceived of as unlimited. On the contrary, Óthe law must,
for polity, social or similar reasons forbid certain forms of agreementÓ.61 For example, agreements
which restrain trade or can be considered to be an abuse of a dominant position are forbidden in
all of the previous mentioned legal systems. These restrictions have in many cases originated
from the belief that the binding effect of the contract and contract stability are important values
worth defending and safeguarding. A Norwegian author has through an enlightening and
illustrative utterance emphasized this matter: ÓWhat an enormous step forward in human history
it was when the rule was established that contracts are binding. That was the rule that made trade
and turnover possibleÓ.62 This statement indicates that contract stability is the foundation or the
basis of trade and competition.
Bearing this in mind, one can, moreover, argue that contractual freedom would not be of great
value unless contracts were granted legal protection so that breaches of contract in some way are
sanctioned. Accordingly, there is no doubt that Ócontractual freedom in reality includes a
requirement for active support from the legal system: that the sanctity of the contract be upheld
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by the legal machineryÓ.63 In other words, ÓÔContractual freedomÕ is consequently not merely a
freedom from public intervention: it is also a claim for public actionÓ.64 Hence, one can,
admittedly, discern an interaction between contractual freedom and contractual stability , since
contractual freedom demands a certain degree of contractual stability. Certainly, contractual
stability is a necessity in order for contractual freedom to function. Accordingly, contractual
stability is not only the basis for trade and competition, it is, additionally, the foundation for
contractual freedom. It can, thus, be concluded that contractual freedom and contractual stability
are not in a state of opposition, but rather co-operate in order for trade and competition to
function satisfactory and, therefore, a balancing of these freedoms is desirable. As shown in
previous chapters, this balancing of contractual freedom and contractual stability is recognized in
all the legal systems compared except for the Swedish legal system which more clearly
emphasizes the contractual freedom. The Swedish system, thus, seems to consider contractual
freedom and contractual stability to be in a state of opposition rather than to acknowledge the
interaction between them. In the other systems, and especially in the Common Law system
which seems to be the strongest contract protector, the contract can be regarded as a stronger
legal instrument with a stronger position in commercial life due to this balancing act.
As already stated, contractual freedom can never be unlimited. Accordingly, even though
contracts are free as to form with a few exceptions, contractual freedom does not imply a
freedom to agree on any content whatsoever. Consequently, in all legal systems there are
regulations which forbid and try to prevent certain content which is considered morally or
socially-ethically reprehensible. Again, agreements which restrain trade or are an abuse of a
dominant position can serve as examples. In addition, in all legal systems compared, except for
the Swedish system, it is considered wrong to enter an agreement which, according to its content,
makes another known contract, to which one of the contracting parties is also a party, impossible
to perform in part or completely. The English Common law system and the French system are
most severe, since mere knowledge of the other contract will suffice to make the new contract
content unlawful while, for instance, the German system, in addition, requires a lack of
consideration or decency. The Swedish system, in contrast, supports and tries to uphold the idea
that a contractual freedom is a freedom to, as far as possible, give the contract such content as the
parties to it may agree upon. This Swedish approach to contractual freedom, therefore, excludes
support for contractual stability, since it allows interference content which might weaken the
contract as a legal instrument.
5.2 Inner contract sphere perspective vs Outer contract sphere
perspective
One can argue that there are two different ways of looking at the contract, namely, what I will
here call, Óthe inner contract sphere perspectiveÓ and Óthe outer contract sphere perspectiveÓ. To
begin with, the inner contract sphere perspective is distinguished by the fact that it sees the
contract as an isolated phenomenon. Accordingly, the contract is considered a separate unit
clearly secluded from any surrounding events or incidents. This view protects from attacks
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within the contractual sphere but does not protect from attacks from outside this inner
contractual area. Furthermore, the contract is not put in a context. On the contrary, it is detached
and disconnected from any existing context or coherence. Even though one contractual relation
can be interacting or be intertwined with other contractual relations, this is completely irrelevant
from an innner contract sphere perspective, since each contractual relation is considered an
isolated unit.
In contrast, the outer contract sphere perspective does not view the contract as an isolated or
secluded phenomenon. On the contrary, the contract is put in its context and outside events can
be recognized to influence the contractual relation. As a consequence, undue attacks on the
contractual relation can be dealt with even if the attack derives from outside the contractual
sphere. There is, accordingly, an existing loyalty between the party not a party to the contract
and the contracting parties. This loyalty is, consequently, a loyalty not to interfere with the
contractual relation. In clear contrast to the inner contract sphere perspective, the outer sphere
perspective includes a possibility to impose liability for interference with contractual relations,
since it has a wider protection area and, thus, upholds the contract as a legal instrument with
greater stress.
The outer contract sphere perspective can be held to be found in Common law and French law
while German law and the Nordic law systems all share an inner contract sphere perspective.
However, the German, Finnish, Danish and Norwegian law have recognized that the inner
contract sphere perspective is not sufficient to protect the contract from undue interferences, and
this fact is not satisfactory since such interferences might weaken the contract as a legal
instrument. Therefore, these systems have produced rules which allow exceptions whenever this
is considered necessary. Swedish law, however, has not followed their example and produced
such rules. Instead, Swedish case-law has developed a particular doctrine which tries to squeeze
undue behaviour from the outer sphere into the inner contractsphere by expanding the
contractual sphere as described in the previous chapter.
An interesting consequence of these two different contract perspectives is the fact that the
responsibility to protect the contractual relation from undue interference attacks falls on different
parties depending on which perspective is prevailing. Consequently, the inner contract sphere
perspective implies that if the interest of an undisturbed relation is great then this should be
procured through the terms of the agreement. This argument puts a great burden of responsibility
on the parties to the contract which not seldom have neither the time, the resources,  nor the
possibility to negotiate such terms in each and every case. The outer contract sphere perspective,
on the other hand, puts the responsibility for an undisturbed relation on the party not a party to
the contract. This party, consequently, has a loyalty to refrain from interference if the
contractual relation is known to him. If not, this party should bear the consequences for
interfering. This perspective, certainly, implies that it is unreasonable for contracting parties to
safeguard from a stranger to the contract and that,  instead, the stranger has better opportunities
to safeguard the contractual relation, since he actually has knowledge of his counterpart.
5.3 Contract views - a summary
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To sum up, there is no doubt that the attitude towards liability for pure economic loss regarding
interference with contractual relations to a large extent depends on the emphasis put on the
importance of the contract as a legal instrument. Accordingly, if a legal system finds the contract
to be important as a means to promote trade and competition in commercial life then this fact is
shown in the contract view. Consequently, a legal system which tries to balance contractual
freedom with contractual stability is, certainly, trying to uphold and strengthen the contract in
order to strengthen trade and competition. Furthermore, a legal system which prefers an outer
contract sphere perspective in front of an inner contract sphere perspective can also be said to
underline the importance of protecting the contract as a legal instrument and, thus, uphold it and
strengthen its function.
6 The underlying interest
After having studied the interference with contractual relations tort, its applicability in different
legal systems, the different prevailing approaches to pure economic loss and, finally, the different
views of the contract as a legal instrument, it is about time to examine the underlying interest of
the interference tort. Hopefully, the following study will show what has so far only been hinted
in this essay, namely,  which value it is necessary to protect through the interference doctrine in
33
order to procure a strong and credible contract instrument. Certainly, I must first acknowledge
the fact that there is more than one single valuable interest which the law embraces and shelters
so that the contract as a legal instrument can be upheld and function in commercial life. However,
these interests are protected through other legal acts or doctrines and are, therefore, not protected
through the interference tort in particular. The mode of procedure I have chosen to follow when
exploring these interests is to take a closer look at the Swedish legal system with its inner
contractsphere perspective, since this system does not recognize the interference doctrine, to
find out if there is any interest left unprotected in the tri-partite situations in question.
6.1 The competition interest
The value of competition is probably indisputable. Society has a great interest in striving for an
efficient resource allocation in order to reduce costs and to lower prices for consumers. However,
the idea of free competition has been abandoned and replaced with the idea of a workable
competition.65 Undoubtedly, this is due to the acknowledgement that it is necessary to regulate
the market to prevent abuse of competition. This in order to bring it closer to the ideal.
Intervention has, thus, been considered necessary to preserve real choice for consumers and to
protect and make it possible for small traders to exist on the market.66 As a consequence, the
competition interest is protected through competition law which has introduced prohibitions of,
for example, joint efforts to restrain trade and unilateral abuse of market power. There is,
therefore, no doubt that interference with contractual relations which consists of agreements
between undertakings which may distort competition or of abuse of a dominant position can
constitute liability under competition law. This is also true in the Swedish legal system.
Consequently, liability for such interference can be imposed according to ¤ 33 of the Swedish
Competition Act.  The actual interest of competition is, thus, already safeguarded through careful
consideration and balancing in competition law.
6.2 SocietyÕs interest in crime prevention
Certainly, societyÕs interest in crime prevention is recognized in all the compared legal systems.
Therefore, it is also undisputed that interference with contractual relations which amounts to a
criminal offence is reprehensible. As an example of such interference I will give an account of a
case consisting of deliberate spreading of lies and defamation.
The company American Express decided to buy the Trade Development Bank of Geneva. This
was mainly in order to benefit from the prominent business skills of its founder, Edmond Safra,
who had unique and valuable connections with moneyed persons. However, the parties parted
since their management styles proved incompatible. American Express were greatly annoyed
when they learned that valuable executives were leaving them to reconnect with Safra who was to
resume banking in Geneva if he obtained a Swiss permit. Some other executives in American
Express, therefore, procured, for $1 million, the services of a shady character who planted
statements in newspapers around the world that SafraÕs bank was guilty of laundering drug
money and even accused Safra of murder. It took great effort to discover the true circumstances
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behind it all but when it was brought to light American Express in 1989 produced a press release
in the form of a letter to Edmond Safra:
ÓThis effort was totally contrary to the standards of conduct of American Express as well
as common standards of decency and ethics. While I believe in vigorous competition, there
is no room in our organization for actions which could cause unjustified harm to a
competitor. Therefore I want to apologize to you and your organizationÓ.67
The Swedish Tort Law Act also acknowledges the fact that interferences which amounts to a
criminal offence is reprehensible. In ¤ 2:4 it states, as indicated earlier, that ÓWhoever causes pure
economic loss through a crime shall compensate that injury...Ó.68 Accordingly, societyÕs interest
in crime prevention is already recognized in tort law.
 6.3 The contract interest
The contract interest can be defined as a contractual creditorÕs right that a certain result be
achieved, namely, the performance of the contract. Accordingly, the parties to a contract should
ascertain that what they have agreed upon will be executed. All according to the principle pacta
sunt servanda - contracts are binding. If either of the contracting parties does not perform
according to the contract or breaches the contract, the other party is, undoubtedly, to be
compensated. This is all established in contract law. In Sweden this is not regulated in any article
but follows from general contract law principles. One can, thus, argue that the contract intrest is
a legal right which emerges at the closing of the agreement. This right, as argued in the previous
chapter, would be of little value unless it was granted legal protection so that breaches of contract
in some way are sanctioned. Contract law is, therefore, protecting this legal right that a certain
result be achieved. The contract interest is, accordingly, already safeguarded by contract law.
6.4 The legal-ethical interest
Beside the competition interest, the contract interest and societyÕs interest in crime prevention
there is an additional interest which is only protected in tort law and which can be traced if
examining the legal systems which permit liability for interference with contractual relations.
Undoubtedly, this interest is difficult to summarize in one word, however, I will here call it the
legal-ethical interest. So, when glancing at the previous chapters certain closely connected words
and phrases frequently recur. These are, for instance, Óimproper means, behaviour considered
wrongful and socially unacceptable, behaviour which offends ethical principles or  good morals,
illoyal behaviour, fundamental concepts of morally acceptable conduct, minimum standards of
conduct required by legal and social ethics, and collusionÓ. These words and phrases all indicate
that there is a moral or ethical interest which requires protection. The interference tort has,
accordingly, been held to protect from interferences constituting, for example, deception,
dishonesty, lying, seduction, misinformation, blackmail, deliberately prejudicial conduct, and
skulduggery.
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It is a central circumstance in the legal-ethical interference tort that the economic harm in question
is deliberately caused. Consequently, it is a matter of great difference between Óthe plaintiff as
target and as by-blow victimÓ.69 It is considered morally reprehensible to use the contractor as a
means of hurting the plaintiff. The moral core in interference with contractual relations can,
therefore, be said to be the intention of the defendant. Or put in another way: ÓIf I persuade
someone, whether by stick or carrot, to conduct himself at variance with his duties under a
contract, I have altered his conduct, I have perverted him, or converted him to my use as a means
of inflicting harm which otherwise would not occur ....this seduction is in itself a wrong...Ó.70
The legal-ethical interest can thus be said to consist of two parts. Firstly, there is a focus on the
behaviour. Wrongful and socially unacceptable behaviour is to be prevented. Secondly, there is a
focus on the primary wrongdoer. It is considered that the behaviour of the primary wrongdoer,
C, and the secondary wrongdoer, B, is a joint responsibility and therefore there should be a joint
liability to compensate the plaintiff, A. Consequently, it is morally right to impose a liability on
the primary wrongdoer.
It is interesting to observe, that tort law and contract law have two different visual points or
rather concentrate on different directions when it comes to protecting interests. While the
contract law, as mentioned, is concentrating on protecting a legal right, the tort law is instead
focused on the actual wrong. Thus, tort law is scanning for behaviour which can be criticized and
corrected. Tort law and contract law, therefore, serve two different purposes. The contractual
creditorÕs right is that a certain result be achieved not that the debtor behaves in a morally
impeccable way. Certainly, the debtor can behave as an angel but will still be liable to
compensate the creditor if he is in breach of the contract. Behaviour or conduct are simply not
matters which are necessarily relevant in contract law. In tort law, though, it is a matter of great
concern. This concern is dealt with through different methods in the different legal systems.
Accordingly, English Common law has established that it is an immoral act performed by the
defendant to interfere in a contractual relation if he has knowledge of the relation. In German law
all factors of the individual case are considered when deciding whether an interference is contra
bonos mores while in Danish and Norwegian law there is a weighing of the benefit of the conduct
against the injury of the conduct to decide whether the behaviour is unlawful. By focusing on the
actual behaviour, thus, a legal system can safeguard the legal-ethical interest. Denying this
interest or paying no or little attention to it can result in a weakening of the contract as a legal
instrument since the plaintiff cannot count on being protected from morally and socially
unacceptable behaviour and, therefore, has to put a lot of time, effort and resources into
procuring such protection himself. It is, in this light, peculiar that Swedish law, as the only legal
system of the compared, has shown no interest in protecting the legal-ethical interest. The right
forum for such an interest would certainly be tort law, since tort law serves the possibility of
focusing on the conduct and behaviour of the defendant.
7 Arguments against liability
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It has, so far, been shown that different legal systems, certainly, have different approaches to
interference with contractual relations. Depending on the attitude towards pure economic loss
and the importance of the contract as a functioning legal instrument, different legal systems have
chosen different methods or techniques to deal with interference situations. However, it has also
been shown that an absolute exclusionary rule and an inner contract sphere perspective do not
allow a legal system to protect the legal-ethical interest which otherwise can be sheltered and
upheld by the interference tort. Accordingly, a legal system based on an absolute exclusionary
rule and an inner contract sphere perspective,  with its lack of concern for legal-ethical interests,
has chosen not to support the contract as a legal instrument with a complete protection.
Certainly, a logical and natural question following this statement is the question why a legal
system chooses not to implement such complete protection. What reflections and well-reasoned
considerations lie behind such a standpoint? Are there any conflicting interests? Since the
Swedish legal system is the only system of the compared which has consistently refused to
acknowledge liability for interference with contractual relations, the following arguments have
been searched for and found in Swedish doctrine.
7.1 The simple rule argument
To begin with, the simple rule argument turns up frequently in the doctrine. This argument has
its roots in the fear that a rule allowing third parties to claim compensation might open the gate
for a flood of claims for compensation.71 To avoid this risk it is simply easier to create a rule
which allows all or nothing to be claimed. Of course, the latter has been preferred. An absolute
exclusionary rule is, therefore, considered to be a very simple and easily applied rule and even
though it has been acknowledged that the results of such a rule sometimes may turn out or prove
to be arbitrary, this is a fact one simply has to accept if one is interested in having easily applied
rules.72 One author has argued that the existence of a simple and easily applied rule is often
highly appreciated by those who can, thanks to such a rule, without bringing a case to court
decide in a particular case whether a claim for compensation can be forwarded and accepted by
the parties. Furthermore, it has been argued that sometimes one has simply to accept a rule
without the existence of any rational motives supporting it73. Thus, one can discern process
economic and technical reasons for accepting a simple rule. Since there are often very complicated
facts and relations involved in tri-partite cases it can be valuable to have a simple rule which
draws up clear limitations. The simple rule argument, moreover, implies that it is possible to
regulate liability for pure economic loss in completely different areas through one single and
generally applicable rule. These arguments lead to the conclusion that there is no liability for
interference with contractual relations in Swedish tort law simply because there is not!74
Undoubtedly, the simple rule argument can in many respects be rejected. Firstly, a simple rule is
not always the remedy for complicated cases. This method of grasping a complex and nuanced
reality to squeeze and force it into a Ófits allÓ tin is, certainly, a way of closing oneÕs eyes to the
true nature of reality. Secondly, a simple rule can be rejected since it excludes claims which can be
considered motivated.75 The value of simplicity cannot be valued more than the value of justice.
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This might lead to the unsatisfactory result that formality and chance may rule. Thirdly, a simple
rule, certainly, excludes uncomfortable discussions. However, such an exclusion implies Óa return
to the unashamed pragmatism which believes that it is better that lawyers should be able to tell
their clients what the law is, even if they cannot assert any rational justification for its
consequencesÓ.76 Surely, there is a false sound in such a pragmatism. Finally, one must certainly
remember that the purpose of law is not to be simple, but rather to function and serve as a tool in
conflicts to bring some kind of justice to the world. However, there might be some truth involved
in the statement that ÓLawyers in general and judges in particular are conservative by nature;
they prefer the devil they know (injustice and artificiality in some cases) to the devil they do not
know (uncertainty)Ó.77
7.2 The legal certainty argument
An argument closely linked to the simple rule argument is the idea that a simple rule which
excludes liability for interference with contractual relations benefits legal certainty. Thus, the
importance of foreseeability is underlined and stressed. Consequently, it is argued that a liability
for interference with contractual relations would cause great uncertainty in practical business
life.78 This argument implies that it is better to cling to a principle, even if it in some cases results
in misery, than to allow exceptions to cause uncertainty, since if Ósuch detraction were to be
permitted in one particular case, it would lead to attempts to have it permitted in a variety of
other particular casesÓ.79 In Swedish doctrine it is, furthermore, argued that liability for pure
economic loss might result in discretionary judgements and, thus, supply the judge with too
much power. One can also in this context acknowledge the fact that German law, with its ¤ 826
which imposes liability when the interference is performed in a manner contra bonos mores, has
been much criticized from a legal certainty perspective. For instance, it has been questioned: ÓIs
the judge simply to consult his conscience, the inner forum? Does he go in for sociological
investigation or speculation and ask what other people would think immoral?Ó.80
The legal certainty argument must of course be taken seriously. However, it is inevitable that all
matters of law involve matters of judgement and this duty always falls on the judge. This is
nothing unique to interference cases. Moreover, it would not be wise for a legal system not to
allow case-law development when this is found necessary or to prevent change when the state of
society changes with reference to legal certainty. A legal system must, consequently,
continuously be shaped according to the requirements of reality. Hence, reality must not be
shaped according to the requirements of the legal system merely to promote foreseeability.
7.3 The freedom of competition argument
The freedom of competition argument implies that since competition between business men is
something desirable and worth striving towards, tort law should not be used as a means to
compensate the injured party. On the contrary, Óthe right to cause losses to others through
competition is said to demonstrate that society not only accepts but even approves of such
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lossesÓ.81 It is part of the game so to speak and once youÕve started you must take the
consequences. Accordingly, no rule is necessary to separate the lawful from the unlawful82 since
such a rule would limit the freedom of competition in an unacceptable way which might restrain
trade.
Furthermore, it is argued that there is a certain interdependence of individual rights in a legal
system. Consequently, freedoms such as freedom of establishment, freedom of association and,
also, freedom of competition interact with the Ókey freedomÓ of contract. This implies that far-
reaching interference in the freedom of competition Ómay in practice deprive contractual freedom
of a large part of its contentÓ.83 But, it does also imply that without a certain degree of
contractual freedom, freedom of competition Óis impossible to maintain or is for practical
purposes without contentÓ.84 However, even if there is no doubt about the fact that freedom of
competition is an extremely important phenomenon, one must still pay attention to the fact that
some reprehensible and improper behaviour in a competition situation can actually amount to an
abuse of competition and is, therefore, not at all to be considered to fall under the concept
freedom of competition. Such abuse has a detrimental influence and effect on competition, since
it causes a misallocation of resources. Accordingly, undue interference with contractual relations
can be considered to be an abuse of competition. To allow such behaviour can twist and distort
competition, since the resources are not allocated where they would be allocated if proper
competition methods were used. Moreover, to allow socially unacceptable behaviour in business
relations invites abuse of economic power. This cannot be acceptable in a society which
supports and forwards a freedom of competition. Therefore, I believe it is desirable to define
freedom of competition as a freedom to compete without undue interference with contractual
relations and not as a freedom to compete even with means of undue interference. Or as an
English author has expressed it:
ÓFreedom to compete effectively depends partly on knowledge that validly made contracts
cannot lightly be interfered with; hence Ôthe right of competition furnishes no justification
for an act done by the use of means which in their nature are in violation of the principle on
which it restsÕÓ.85
7.4 The self-regulation argument
This argument implies that competition is not to be regulated by law, but rather by the
participants on the market through their agreements. Consequently, the regulation and
demarcation of which behaviour is to be considered lawful in competition and which behaviour is
to be considered unlawful is to be decided by the businessmen themselves. This self-regulation is
said to produce efficient companies and is cost-efficient to society, since the legal system with
its courts is not involved. It is according to this argument better to have supervising authorities to
clear the market of the worst competition conduct than to have the legislator drawing up the
limits for and thereby governing business activities. Certainly, this idea does not put the
individual case in focus but rather implies that if a business or company continuously indulges in
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objectionable conduct it will not survive on the market, since the other participants will condemn
its behaviour and refuse to do business with it and in this way keep it out of the market.
In my opinion, this self-regulation argument can be refuted by two arguments. Firstly, on the
basis that it shows little concern for the individual businessman. Certainly, he will not benefit or
be helped by the fact that, eventually, the wrongdoer might disappear from the market, since this
will be too late for the individual who has already been damaged or ruined by the wrongdoer.
Secondly, small and medium-sized enterprises with little economic strength and power will not
participate or have a voice when deciding what kind of behaviour is acceptable or not on the
market. Hence, economic power will regulate the market and decide the character of the existing
and prevailing conduct. Companies equipped with economic power will, thus, be able to interfere
with contractual relations using any reprehensible and socially unacceptable behaviour in order to
damage or bring a party to ruin. Accordingly, self-regulation signifies that economic power sets
the standards on the market, which is far from acceptable or desirable.
7.5 The insurance argument
Since the Nordic countries, compared to the other countries in Europe, have been very eager to
integrate into their law of tort regards for insurance law and methods of mitigating damage86, it is
perhaps not so surprising to find this insurance argument in Swedish doctrine. Thus, the
insurance argument implies that, since the third party can provide his own protection through an
insurance and since he has a better possibility to calculate and form an opinion of his own risks
and of a suitable insurance, he has, consequently, to procure such protection for himself through
an insurance if he has a great interest in an undisturbed relation.87 Regulation in law is thus
superfluous and in case the third party has not acquired an insurance he only has himself to
blame. Furthermore, the incentive to mitigate and limit damage is considered to be stronger if the
third party is to carry the loss.88 However, these arguments can be contradicted, since the
existence of an insurance reduces the motivation for the defendant to avoid damages.89 Thus, the
preventive purpose is ineffective. In addition, it is not self-evident that a third party shall carry
insurance costs simply in order to protect himself from interferences. Finally, it is not possible at
present to take out an insurance policy on interference with contractual relations. The insurance
argument is, therefore, not a real option.
7.6 Pro and against Interference with contractual relations
Having ploughed through the different and diverse arguments against a liability to compensate
pure economic loss due to interference with contractual relations one can, certainly, ascertain that
the different arguments are more or less advanced and more or less convincing. In my opinion the
legal certainty argument carries a certain convincing force while the simple rule argument is a
regrettable phenomenon. Strangely enough though, the simple rule argument is the most
frequently found argument in Swedish doctrine besides the freedom of competition argument. It
is, certainly, a peculiar attitude to deny a complete protection for the contract as a legal
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instrument due to the fact that it is simple to deny such protection. According to such an
argumentation one can actually even argue that it is simplest not to offer any protection at all!
Thus, as we have seen the Swedish legal system has due to the simple rule argument, the legal
certainty argument, the freedom of competition argument, the self-regulation argument and the
insurance argument chosen not to introduce any liability for interference with contractual
relations. This attitude, as we have seen, can, due to the fact that it doesnÕt protect the legal-
ethical interests, weaken the contract as a legal instrument and in the prolongation have a
weakening effect on competition and trade. The Swedish legal system, however, stands on its
own with this attitude and prioritization. All of the other above-analysed legal systems have in
some way with different methods and techniques acknowledged the fact that it is important to
protect the legal-ethical interest in order to uphold the contract and promote competition and
trade. Certainly, this has not been an easy task. On the contrary, it can only be achieved through
a careful balancing of contractual freedom and contractual stability, but since this balancing act is
a complicated matter and demands an advanced thoroughness, uncomfortable discussions and
much consideration there is always an option to play it the simple way!
8 Concluding words
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It has been shown that liability for interference with contractual relations calls for a constant and
continuous adjustment of competing interests. Consequently, Óopposed to the plaintiffÕs demand
for protection against injury is invariably the defendantÕs countervailing interest not to be
impeded in the pursuit of his own wants and desiresÓ.90 Thus, the interest in contractual freedom
stands against the interest in contractual stability and Óthe administration of law involves a
weighing of these conflicting interests on the scales of social value, with a view to promoting a
balance that will minimise friction and be most conducive to the public goodÓ.91 A legal system
without a liability for interference with contractual relations does not acknowledge the
importance of such a balancing act. Instead of embracing both contractual freedom and
contractual stability there is a preference in favour of contractual freedom. The contractual
freedom can, therefore, in such legal systems be defined as a freedom to contract even with undue
means of interference. In legal systems which acknowledge liability for interference with
contractual relations, however, contractual stability is strengthened and emphasized and
contractual freedom can be defined as a freedom to contract without undue interference.
It has, thus, been shown that the attitude towards liability for interference with contractual
relations depends on the emphasis put on the importance of the contract as a legal instrument.
Accordingly, if a legal system finds the contract to be important as a means of promoting  trade
and competition then this fact is shown by an acceptance of the interference tort. An acceptance
of liability for interference is, consequently, a balancing of contractual freedom and contractual
stability in order to strengthen and uphold the contract as a legal instrument and to promote trade
and competition.
It has, furthermore, been shown that the interest protected by the interference tort is the legal-
ethical interest. In addition one can, therefore, establish that by protecting the legal-ethical
interest a legal system upholds the contract as a legal instrument and, as a consequence, it
promotes trade and competition. These interests are, thus, connected. One can, therefore, argue
that a legal system which does not protect the legal-ethical interest through an interference tort
weakens the contract as a legal instrument and, as a consequence, weakens trade and competition.
There are, admittedly, as we have seen arguments in favour of such a weakening process.
However, as has been shown, these can all be refuted or contradicted.
My conclusion is, therefore, that it is important to stand up for and protect legal-ethical values
by imposing a liability to compensate pure economic loss caused by interference with contractual
relations. There is, undoubtedly, a legal-ethical value in acknowledging a liability for the the
primary wrongdoer, the original initiator of breaching the contract, and not only to acknowledge a
liability for the secondary wrongdoer. Or can anyone deny the fact that the serpent was worse
than Eve?92
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